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How, despite all the academic evidence and popular common sense, do the 
evangelists for free markets and the pursuit of profit as the magic elixir for all the 
world’s perils and problems, still get a hearing, let alone control of pubic policy? The 
unregulated pursuit of speculative profit by the banks brought the economies of the 
world to the brink of collapse, yet we are told that it is public services that have to suffer 
in order to subsidise the bonuses of speculators.  
 
Gordon Brown, more than any other single political leader, tipped the world economy 
back from even greater disasters, yet the message still goes out that it is not the huge 
rescue package for the banks, but some failure of the Labour government, which has 
created debt and economic depression. The US has lamentable health provision -  its 
life expectancy and infant mortality, are worse than those in Britain.  Yet we are told 
that the NHS, one of the most effective health services in the world in terms of both 
cost and health promotion, needs to be infused with the magic of markets. How have 
the liberal economic Taleban managed, so successfully, to achieve and to retain their 
ideological hegemony in the face of the complete failure of their policies to achieve 
anything save the redistribution of wealth upwards? 
 
The question is not only about the present government of the UK, but is the old and 
persistent ones of how do ideas and policies change, and how is hegemony achieved? 
In the years before the second world war, economic depression challenged the 
prevailing orthodoxies of liberal economics, but though they were dented by Keynes 
and the evidence of economic failure, they were not demolished. By the second half of 
the last century they were already being re-established, and with the upsurge of the 
new Right, the ideology of markets, profit, and atomistic individualism achieved not just 
a return but transcendence. 
Angus Burgin tells one part of this story in his account of the Mount Pèlerin Society set 
up by F A Hayek in 1947 and providing a flourishing nursery from which Milton 
Friedman, the other protagonist of this book, emerged. Burgin’s answer to the question 
of how the ideas promulgated by Hayek, Friedman, and their allies and associates 
survived, revived, and conquered is one which members and supporters of the Mount 
Pèlerin Society would have shared, and which Friedman, explicitly provided: intellectual 
trickle down from an elite. Exceptional individuals through a mixture of genius, 
persistence, and hard work transmitted new ideas to a small number of fellow souls 
and, like an ideological pyramid scheme, their ideas slowly infused wider and wider 
circles of society, at least as far down the social ladder as was needed to control the 
levers of power. 
 
But the story presented here makes it clear that the industrious innovator explanation is 
not the whole truth, delightful though it is to see Hayek and Friedman as right-wing 
Leninists leading the vanguard party of profit seeking. Both Marx and Weber have 
something to contribute, the first with an understanding that ideologies are politically 
functional, the second with a conception of the relation between ideas and interests as 
one of elective affinity, whereby ideas both sustain and are sustained by other 
institutions and other forms of social and political action. Just as the Christian church 
was brought into its dominant position by the Emperor Constantine, whose own 
legitimate image was fortified by the church, so capital funded the ideologists of 
economic liberalism, sustaining and being sustained by them. It’s not just a matter of 
more or less effective persuasion. Institutional power and group interest are part of the 
game. 
 
Ideology does not prosper simply as the application, step by logical step, of an 
overarching or fundamental conception or principle. It is not inherently or necessarily 
internally consistent, and has a coherence or unity which is organic rather than 
mechanical or rational. It flourishes when it sustains, and is sustained by, political 
institutions and social and economic power. The economic liberals did not advance on 
the small contributions of public citizens, but on the generous, sustained, and strategic 
funding of private capital. It was a relationship of mutual advantage and dependence 
that Hayek and his colleagues fully recognised, and one which, on occasion, led to 
censorship of their activities by their commercial sponsors. What Burgin’s evidence 
shows, despite his sympathy for the notion of the political intellectual as the innovative 
source of change, is not only the power of ideology, but also the symbiotic relation 
between ideology and other patterns and practices. Ideology is one component of 
politics, and it both sustains and is sustained by institutions and interests. Money, 
discrete and veiled or openly evangelistic, keeps the presses rolling and the meetings 
travelled to. Reason is not the only currency in the market of ideas. Hayek could be 
misleadingly evasive about the relationship between funders and ideologists. Nor did 
the extent of funding for market arguments prevent a persistent insistence by their 
propagators that they were a persecuted and marginalised minority in a world 
dominated by socialism and menaced by communism. 
 
While the history of Pèlerin and after provides plenty of evidence for the elitist side of 
the explanation, it also illustrates how the very character of elitist politics, with its stress 
on leadership and hierarchy, creates tensions and schisms among the chosen. The 
fellowship was frequently riven by disputes in which administrative, political, and 
personal animosities were inextricably tangled. Burgin’s narrative illustrates just what 
Harold Wilson was talking about when, moving into politics he explained that he was 
leaving academic life because he couldn’t cope with all the back-stabbing. Mount 
Pèlerin was frequently in danger of fracturing into a range of smaller foothills. Ironically, 
a body dedicated to proclaiming the necessarily unpredictable consequences of market 
choice and the rights in markets of each individual to pursue their varied ends, was 
characterised by competition for ideological certainty and dominant leadership. As 
Michael Oakeshott roguishly observed in a much-quoted quip: a plan to resist all 
planning was itself a plan.  
 
The similarities between political opponents can be as revealing for observers as they 
are disconcerting for participants. In an account which begins with social democracy 
and the London School of Economics, and ends with doctrinaire market economics in 
Chicago, Burgin deals with protagonists who are remarkably alike in everything, apart 
from their ambitions for their fellow citizens. Fabian Socialism under the Webbs and 
Shaw and the Mount Pèlerin Society under Hayek were each elitist campaigns to 
change the thinking of lesser mortals. Sidney Webb and Milton Friedman each believed 
that all the answers lay in the evidence, and that empirical investigation made 
discussion of value a dilettante distraction. There was a parallel assumption that 
evidence was not something which ordinary people could be relied on to understand. 
Beatrice Webb’s dismissal of ‘the average sensual man’ was matched by the Chicago 
economist Frank Knight’s complaint that Keynes, by siding with ordinary citizens, was 
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‘passing the keys of the citadel out of the window to the Philistines hammering at the 
gates’. 
 
The history of Burgin’s principal subjects, Friedman and Hayek, illustrates another 
feature of intellectual life cycles. Jesus was followed by Paul, Marx by Lenin, and 
Hayek by Friedman. In each case, the second generation sharpens the message by 
narrowing the argument. Whereas Hayek envisaged government providing at least a 
safety net, Friedman wanted an end to public provision in huge swathes, from 
conscription to national parks. Markets untroubled by government which with 
spontaneous order had been for Hayek a component of a free society became, for 
Friedman, the single solution to all of life’s problems, a political and economic Collis 
Browne’s elixir which would bring health, education, and prosperity to all mankind. But 
the sharper the message becomes, the clearer both its aims and its limitations are. The 
economic right was not a coherent ideology either in its perceptions, its values, or its 
aspirations.  
 
There were at least three contenders for the foundation of the crusade: markets as an 
effective distribution mechanism; laissez faire as a virtuous means of individual 
decision making; profit-seeking as a motor for economic growth and innovation. Each 
of these aspirations raised problems. If markets were an effective distribution 
mechanism, what should be distributed, and what should be provided on the basis of 
other criteria than purchasing power? What was due to Caesar, and what to God, or to 
God’s children? If government should step back and allow free individual choice, what 
regulation of that choice was permissible or desirable? If profit-seeking was the most 
effective motor of progress, what justification was there for regulating it, and how 
should it be regulated? Names such as ‘free markets’ or ‘neo-liberalism’ simply masked 
what was, as are all ideologies, a hold-all of aspirations and aversions. 
 
Burgin’s study concentrates on what those whom the author collects under the ‘market’ 
umbrella wanted, and pays less attention to what they opposed. But like any ideology, 
the conceptions and perceptions of this segment of the new Right were composed of 
both aspirations and aversions. The negative and antagonistic side of their ideology is 
at least as revealing, and at least as important, as what they aspired to. It wasn’t just, 
or perhaps even principally, planning which they disliked. Rolling back the state and 
promoting, or permitting, liberty concealed the selectivity of each of those goals. 
‘Rolling back the state’ was a phrase which concealed the rather different aim of rolling 
back the public sector. Each policy arises from a prior choice, explicit or implicit. Burgin 
cites Keynes who pointed out that economic debates were frequently ‘proxies’ for 
arguments about what kind of society you wished to live in and what kind of life you 
wanted to lead. This was clear in Friedman’s attempt to avoid advocating an amoral 
economism where everything had a price, and nothing a value. Free choice in a 
market, he argued, was the most effective promoter of virtue. The completion of this 
argument, however, depended on defining virtue as self-reliance, so constructing a 
circle which maintained that markets were virtuous because they encouraged the form 
of behaviour which they encouraged. 
 
Universal public services, progressive taxation, the provision of goods as a response to 
need, not as a response to ability to pay, and a presumption of equality, were all 
elements in the society which, explicitly or implicitly, the marketers wanted to demolish. 
Liberty was all very well, but equality and fraternity were quite another matter. It was 
equality that was steadily jettisoned even if it had been tolerated at the start of the 
campaign, by those such as Milton Friedman for whom liberal policies were 
increasingly the means to achieve conservative outcomes. But Hayek also had made 
the qualification in his argument that, in order to achieve economic freedom, political 
freedom would need to be curtailed, both by limiting the matters on which democratic 
authority could be exercised, and by limiting the categories of citizens who could be 
allowed to participate in democratic politics. Freedom thus becomes freedom for some, 
while – if goods and services are enjoyed as a result of individual choice, and depend 
upon the economic resources to make such choices –  if you haven’t got them, it can 
be made to feel like your fault. This doubly penalises the poorer citizens by first 
depriving them of benefits enjoyed by the economically more fortunate, and second 
stigmatising them for personal failure. It is the perennial choice between universality 
and equality versus targeting and hierarchy, and the principles which the marketeers 
wanted to dominate in the provision of goods and services, they were all too ready to 
limit in the exercise of citizenship. 
 
Burgin raises, but does not pursue, the question of the status of market ideals after 
2008. The answer to this question though provides evidence for answering the 
question constantly implied but not directly addressed in the bulk of the book: how is 
hegemony achieved and sustained? The text provides plenty of evidence, such as the 
massive proliferation of well-funded, right-wing think tanks in the last quarter of the 20th 
century which, while they were not the sole source of ideological success, provided an 
army of Constantines to turn a sect into an established church. 
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